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Abstract
This paper investigates the e⁄ect of linguistic diversity on redistribution in a broad
cross-section of countries. We use the notion of ￿linguistic distances￿and show that
the commonly used fractionalization index, which ignores linguistic distances, yields
insigni￿cant results. However, once distances between languages are accounted for,
linguistic diversity has both a statistically and economically signi￿cant e⁄ect on re-
distribution. With an average level of redistribution of 9.5 percent of GDP in our
data set, an increase by one standard deviation in the degree of diversity lowers re-
distribution by approximately one percentage point. We also demonstrate that other
measures, such as polarization and peripheral heterogeneity, provide similar results
when linguistic distances are incorporated.
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The literature has long argued that cultural diversity reduces government transfers1 and
that altruistic attitudes are more prevalent within homogenous groups than across eth-
nically or culturally diverse groups.2 If, as posited by Becker (1957), individuals have
stronger feelings of empathy towards their own group, it is not surprising that the U.S.,
where there is a strong racial component to the income distribution and the poor tend to
be viewed as ￿other￿ , exhibits lower levels of redistribution than Western European coun-
tries, where the poor are often seen as ￿unlucky￿(Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001).
One must note, however, that broader cross-country studies have typically failed to pick
up a statistically signi￿cant relation between cultural diversity and transfers (Alesina et
al., 2003).
Most empirical economic studies of diversity use the so-called ELF or fraction-
alization index, which measures the probability of two randomly selected individuals in
society belonging to di⁄erent ethnolinguistic groups. As with Shannon￿ s diversity index
(Shannon, 1949), it fails to take into account the degree of distinctiveness between di⁄er-
ent groups. Compare, for instance, Andorra, where roughly half of the population speaks
Catalan and the other half speaks Spanish (two similar Romance languages), and Bel-
gium, where about 60% of the population speaks Dutch and the other 40% speaks French
(a Germanic and a Romance language). Although one would probably think of Belgium
being linguistically more diverse than Andorra, according to the fractionalization index
Andorra is the more diverse one of the two.
The main contribution of this paper is the incorporation of distances between
di⁄erent groups when measuring diversity. By accounting for distances, we adopt the
Becker (1957) view: not only do individuals prefer their own group, but the degree of
1See Alesina et al. (2003), La Porta et al. (1999), Easterly and Levine (1997), and Luttmer (2001) for
empirical studies; and Caselli and Coleman(2006), FernÆndez and Levy (2007), Lee and Roemer (2004),
and Lind (2007) for theoretical analysis of the relation between diversity and redistribution. For a more
general survey on diversity and di⁄erent measures of economic performance, see Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005).
2See, for example, Vigdor (2004).
2their dislike of other groups depends on how di⁄erent the groups are. An appropriate
analysis of ethnolinguistic diversity should therefore, as suggested by Caselli and Coleman
(2006) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), take into account the dissimilarity between
groups.3 After incorporating distances, we revisit the link between linguistic diversity
and redistribution in a wide cross-section of countries.
Naturally, with nearly 7,000 known living languages and about 200 countries,4
multilingual societies are a common feature across the globe. The underlying motivation
for our work is that sorting out linguistic issues can be quite challenging ￿ ￿language does
not lend itself easily to compromise￿(Laponce, 1992) ￿ and may lead to various degrees
of redistributional tension among groups of citizens. Of course, we do not imply that
languages are the only aspect of group dissimilarity. Instead, our measure of linguistic
diversity should be viewed as a proxy for the broader notion of ethnolinguistic or cultural
diversity.5 In addition to being an important societal characteristic, an attractive feature
of linguistic heterogeneity is that quantifying the degree of dissimilarity between languages
is relatively easy.
The relevance of including distances when measuring diversity is ultimately an
empirical question. To verify whether this feature improves upon the existing results, we
compare the distance-based index with the one that does not includes distances. Failing
to take into account distances makes diversity statistically insigni￿cant.6 However, once
distances are taken into account, diversity becomes statistically signi￿cant at the 1%
or 5% level in virtually all speci￿cations. This e⁄ect is found to be highly robust, and
quantitatively important. Compared to an average level of redistribution of 9.5 percent
3A similar point has been made in earlier theoretical work by Greenberg (1956) and Rao (1982).
4The Ethnologue project lists 6,912 known living languages (www.ethnologue.com). There are 191
member states in the United Nations, while the CIA World Factbook lists 271 nations, which include
certain territories and colonies, such as Puerto Rico or Guadeloupe.
5There are of course examples of countries, such as Rwanda, which are linguistically homogeneous,
but ethnically divided.
6This negative result is consistent with previous work of Alesina et al. (2003). La Porta et al. (1999),
in contrast, do ￿nd a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of ethnolinguistic diversity on redistribution, even
when distances are not accounted for. However, once they control for per capita income, this negative
correlation disappears.
3of GDP, the model predicts that an increase in diversity by one standard deviation lowers
redistribution as a share of GDP by about one percentage point. In other words, an
increase by one standard deviation lowers redistribution by about 10 percent.
To carry out our analysis, we propose a general index of social e⁄ective antag-
onism constructed along the lines of the identi￿cation-alienation framework of Esteban
and Ray (1994). In particular, we consider ￿ve special cases: a diversity index without
distances (ELF) (Atlas Narodov Mira, 1964); a diversity index with distances (Greenberg,
1956); a polarization index without distances (Reynal-Querol, 2002); a polarization index
with distances (Esteban and Ray, 1994); and a peripheral heterogeneity index (Desmet,
Ortuæo-Ort￿n and Weber, 2005). The uni￿ed framework allows us to easily compare the
aforementioned indices.
The wide variety of indices used in the literature partially stems from the fact that
some economic and social outcomes can be explained by societal diversity (Alesina et al.,
2003), while others are better captured by polarization (Esteban and Ray, 1994, 1999).
To illustrate the di⁄erence between diversity and polarization, compare two countries, A
and B. If A consists of two equally sized groups, and B of three equally sized groups, then
A is more polarized, but less diverse, than B. When distances between groups are taken
into account, the di⁄erence between polarization and diversity becomes more subtle. In
that case, increasing the number of equally sized groups need no longer imply increasing
the level of diversity, since distances between groups also play a role.
Again, the question of which index does a better job at explaining redistribution is
an empirical one. The results con￿rm that the crucial di⁄erence is whether distances are
taken into account or not. The di⁄erence between diversity, peripheral heterogeneity and
polarization turns out to be empirically irrelevant. As long as distances are incorporated,
all three indices perform extremely well.7 This is not surprising, as the correlation between
them is high.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general index
7Note, however, that this conclusion di⁄ers from that of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002, 2005) in
their study of civil con￿ icts. This point is discussed in more detail below.
4of social e⁄ective antagonism, and shows that several well known indices of diversity
and polarization are special cases. Section 3 deals with data and measurement issues.
Section 4 computes and discusses the ￿ve di⁄erent diversity and polarization indices for
225 countries. Section 5 shows the strong link between diversity and redistribution, once
distances between languages are taken into account. Section 6 considers polarization and
peripheral heterogeneity. Section 7 concludes.
2 Indices of diversity and polarization
In this section we present a general index of social e⁄ective antagonism that contains as
special cases several indices of diversity and polarization widely used in the literature. To
do so, we follow, with some minor di⁄erences, the identi￿cation-alienation framework of
Esteban and Ray (1994).
Consider a country with a population of N individuals, partitioned into K distinct
groups, indexed by j = 1;:::;K. The population of group j is denoted by Nj. We impose
no conditions on the geographical distribution of the groups. Thus, individuals from a
group can either live in the same region, or be dispersed across di⁄erent regions. Each












j=1 sj = 1. The population shares, rather than their absolute sizes, is what will
matter for our analysis.
A crucial element is the introduction of distances between groups. There is a
matrix T that assigns a distance ￿jk between groups j and k. This distance is a stan-
dardized metric, i.e., all values ￿jk lie between 0 and 1; ￿jj = 0 for all j; ￿jk = ￿kj
for all j and k; and ￿ij ￿ ￿ik + ￿kj for all i;j and k. Our empirical investigation deals
with linguistic distances, where groups are formed by individuals who speak the same
5language, and ￿jk is the linguistic distance between the language spoken by group j and
group k. Even though our model deals with a general concept of distance we adopt the
linguistic terminology hereafter.
In order to de￿ne the notion of social e⁄ective antagonism, we follow Esteban and
Ray (1994) and ￿rst introduce the concepts of alienation and identi￿cation. An individual
of group j feels identi￿ed with other individuals in the same group, e.g., those who speak
the same language. The degree of identi￿cation depends on the size of the group, sj, and
is given by the value s￿
j . In Esteban and Ray (1994) ￿ is a positive number, implying
that the sense of identi￿cation is stronger in a larger group. Instead, we also allow for
￿ = 0, which captures the possibility of identi￿cation being independent of the size of
the group.
The alienation felt by an individual of group j towards an individual of group
k is increasing in the distance ￿jk. The sense of identi￿cation towards the own group
may a⁄ect an individual￿ s alienation towards another group. This interaction between
alienation and identi￿cation yields antagonism. As de￿ned in Esteban and Ray (1994),
the antagonism between an individual of group j and an individual of group k is given
by s￿
j ￿jk. Since there is a fraction sk of individuals who speak language k, the e⁄ective
antagonism of an individual of group j towards group k is sks￿
j ￿jk.8 Given that a share
sj of the population speaks language j, the total e⁄ective antagonism of group j towards
group k is sks1+￿
j ￿jk.
Similar to Esteban and Ray (1994), we can now de￿ne the country￿ s level of social








Depending on the values of ￿ and the distance matrix ￿, the index in (1), henceforth
referred to as A-index, can be shown to generate as special cases di⁄erent indices of
diversity and polarization.
It is useful to distinguish between three di⁄erent distance matrices used in our
8This assumes that population shares, rather than absolute population sizes, matter.
6analysis. The ￿rst, denoted by T, allows for a continuous measure of distance ￿jk on the
interval (0;1] between any two groups j and k, where j 6= k. The second matrix, denoted
by Td, is of a dichotomous nature, where ￿jk = 1 for all j 6= k. Here the distance between
any two distinct groups is 1, so that the alienation experienced by an individual speaking
language j towards an individual speaking any other language does not depend on the
distance between the two languages. The third matrix, denoted by Tc, assumes there is a
center group c, such that ￿jk = 0 if j 6= c and k 6= c. This implies that only the distances
between the central group and the other (peripheral) groups matter.
We now consider ￿ve special cases of the general A-index, each one of which has
been described in the literature.9 Some are indices of diversity and others are indices of
polarization.
1. ELF - (Atlas Narodov Mira, 1964). ￿ = 0 and the distance matrix is Td. The
A-index (1) can be written as





This is the well known ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index (see, e.g., Atlas
Narodov Mira, 1964, Easterly and Levine, 1997, and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly,
1999), known elsewhere as the Gini-Simpson index. The ELF index measures the
probability of two randomly chosen individuals being from di⁄erent groups and does
not take into account the distances between the di⁄erent groups. It satis￿es the
fundamental requirements of diversity (Shannon, 1949):
(i) for a given number of groups, the index reaches its maximum when all groups
are of the same size;
(ii) and if all groups are of equal size, then the society with a larger number of
groups possesses a higher index of diversity.
9See Esteban and Ray (2006) for a similar discussion in the cases of polarization and ELF.








This index was proposed by Greenberg (1956) and was examined (as quadratic
entropy) in Rao (1982).10 GI computes the population weighted total distances
between all groups11 and can be interpreted as the expected distance between two
randomly selected individuals.12 GI is essentially a generalization of ELF, whereby
distances between di⁄erent groups are taken into account. Naturally, GI does not
satisfy the requirements of a diversity index mentioned above and the maximal
diversity need not be attained when all groups are of the same size. In fact, one
can ￿nd distance matrices for which the maximum value of the index is obtained
when at least one group i has population share si = 0, even though the distance
from that group to any other group is strictly positive, i.e., ￿ij > 0 for all j 6= i.13
This explains why some authors refer to GI as a ￿weak diversity￿index (Ricotta,
2005).






j(1 ￿ sj) (4)
which is the polarization index proposed by Reynal-Querol (2002).14 Similarly
to ELF, RQ does not take into account distances between groups. It attains its
maximum when there are two groups of equal size.
10See also Nei and Li (1979), Fearon (2003) and Bossert, D￿ Ambrosio and La Ferrara (2006).
11If ￿jk were the income di⁄erence between group j and group k, GI would coincide with the Gini
index.
12Ricotta and Szeidl (2006) argue that this index can be viewed as the expected con￿ ict among species
in a given environment.
13Pavoine, Ollier and Pontier (2005) show that in the case of ultrametric distances all groups must have
a strictly positive population share for the index to be maximized.
14Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) show that when the distance matrix is T
d, the parameter ￿ has
to be equal to 1 for the index to satisfy the properties of polarization.









In fact, this is a special case of the polarization index in Esteban and Ray (1994),
who allow for ￿ to be in the range of [1;1:6].15 As with GI, this index controls
for distances between groups. If distances between all groups are the same, it is
perfectly correlated with RQ.
5. PH (peripheral heterogeneity in Desmet, Ortuæo-Ort￿n and Weber, 2005). ￿ = 0





where the central group c is the largest. PH is a special case of the diversity index
studied in Desmet, Ortuæo-Ort￿n and Weber (2005). It is important to point out
that PH is a variant of GI, with the di⁄erence that it takes into account the alien-
ation between the center and the peripheral groups, but not between the peripheral
groups themselves. Note that PH can be viewed as an intermediate index between
diversity and polarization. If all distances to the center are equal, then any vec-
tor of population shares, including the one with all peripheral groups having equal
shares, attains the maximum. However, if distances to the center are not equal,
then A(0;Tc) attains a maximum when only the center and the peripheral group
with the highest value of ￿cj have strictly positive population shares.
The ELF index, which has been widely used to study the e⁄ects of diversity on
di⁄erent economic outcomes, is based on a dichotomous 0-1 distance measure. As soon as
two linguistic groups are di⁄erent, they are assigned a distance of 1. However, in practice
de￿ning when a group is distinct from another can be di¢ cult. For example, should we
15Actually, to satisfy all the polarization properties in Esteban and Ray (1994), the matrix distance
should be additive, i.e. ￿ik = ￿ij+￿jk (Duclos, Esteban and Ray, 2004). We do not impose this condition,
since the language distances in the multidimensional space do not satisfy it.
9consider speakers of Venetian and Italian as members of di⁄erent groups in the same way
as speakers of Greek and Turkish? These two pairs are drastically di⁄erent: Venetian
is a dialect of Italian, whereas Greek and Turkish pertain to entirely di⁄erent families,
Greek to the Indo-European one and Turkish to the Altaic one. In using ELF, one might
decide to assign a distance of 0 to Venetian and Italian, and a distance of 1 to Greek
and Turkish. This choice implies aggregating speakers of Venetian and Italian into one
group. Thus, the problem of assigning distances turns into the problem of identifying
groups. GI has a clear advantage in this regard: by shifting from a dichotomous 0-1
measure to a continuous measure of distance, GI avoids the ad hoc group identi￿cation
problem. Venetian and Italian are considered as two di⁄erent languages, with a small
distance between the two.16 Even though GI has been examined by several authors, it
has not been used to study the e⁄ects of within country diversity on di⁄erent economic
variables.17
Of course, whether GI improves upon ELF in its capacity to explain redistribution
is eventually an empirical question. From a theoretical point of view, it is not entirely
obvious whether using a continuous measure of distance should improve the results. One
might argue, as we do in this paper, that the degree of con￿ ict depends not only on the
number and the sizes of the di⁄erent groups, but also on how di⁄erent they are. However,
it is also possible that the basis for the alienation experienced by individuals of one ethnic
group towards individuals of another ethnic group is simply the fact that they belong to
di⁄erent groups, regardless of their cultural distances. This is the view of Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2005), who claim that the dynamics of the ￿ we￿versus ￿ you￿distinction is
more powerful than the antagonism generated by the distance between them. However, this
does not free them altogether from assigning distances. Indeed, Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005) focus on what they call ￿relevant￿ groups. By selecting which groups
16Note that GI satis￿es a ￿continuity property￿ : when the distance between two groups tends to zero,
the diversity approaches the limit where both groups are merged into a single one.
17For example, Fearon (2003) uses GI to compute a measure of cultural diversity for 160 countries, but
he does not analyze its e⁄ect on economic variables, whereas Spolaore and Wacziarg (2006) use GI to
measure diversity between countries and explore its relation to bilateral income di⁄erences.
10are ￿relevant￿ , they implicitly employ a dichotomous 0-1 distance measure between all
groups.
Some authors have argued that ethnic con￿ ict is better measured by the degree of
polarization than by the degree of diversity (Esteban and Ray, 1994, 1999). As mentioned
above, for a given number of groups, in absence of distance considerations, diversity is
maximized when all groups are of equal size. In contrast, polarization is maximized when
two of the groups consist each of half of the population and all other groups have zero
population. If there are only two groups, then polarization and diversity yield identical
rankings. Moreover, in practice, there is a signi￿cant overlap between both notions, and
ranking countries based on either polarization or diversity produces similar results. We
will consider two di⁄erent indices of polarization, with ER using a continuous measure
of distance, and RQ a dichotomous measure of distance. Therefore, the link between ER
and RQ is the same as between GI and ELF.
In addition to comparing ELF and GI, and ER and RQ, we also analyze the
empirical relevance of the PH index, which does not treat group heterogeneity in a sym-
metric manner. This index focuses on the tension that emanates from the heterogeneity
between a central dominant group and the peripheral minority groups. Apart from being
theoretically a di⁄erent concept, this index has the advantage of requiring a smaller set
of distance data.
Although from a theoretical point of view all these indices are di⁄erent, in practice
some of them may yield similar conclusions. In fact, as we will see, the correlation between
all these indices is relatively high, and the only factor which is important in the empirical
analysis is whether we use continuous (GI, PH and ER) or dichotomous (ELF and RQ)
measures of distances. The distinction between GI, PH and ER does not seem to be
empirically relevant to the problem at hand.
3 Data and measurement issues
Our data cover a wide cross-section of countries. The information on how many people
speak a given language in a given country comes from the Ethnologue project. What
11sets the Ethnologue apart from other sources, such as the Britannica Book of the Year, is
its detail. For example, in the case of Mexico the Ethnologue lists 291 living languages,
much higher than the 21 languages listed in the 1990 edition of the Britannica. Although
some aspects of the Ethnologue have been used before (Fearon, 2003; Alesina et al.,
2003), its greater detail in terms of languages spoken across countries has so far been
left unexploited by economists. One reason could be that when data are highly detailed,
the problem of group identi￿cation arises. In the absence of information on linguistic
distances, one has to assign a distance of either zero or one between Venetian and Italian.
This problem does not show up in the less detailed Britannica, which already implicitly
aggregates the speakers of Venetian and Italian into a single group.18
The introduction of linguistic distances largely resolves the group identi￿cation
problem. It is no longer necessary to make ad hoc choices about whether Venetian and
Italian belong to the same group. By using the detailed Ethnologue, we maintain Venetian
and Italian as two distinct groups, but assign a small, but non-zero, distance between the
two, based on linguists￿assessment of how di⁄erent these languages are, as we further
explain below. In general, once we have detailed information about distances between
languages, then more disaggregated data become preferable. In contrast to much of the
literature, we therefore make no choices about when a group is a group.19 Instead, we
use the entire Ethnologue database ￿ even if this implies 291 languages in Mexico ￿
but correct for distances.
There are di⁄erent ways of measuring distances between languages. A ￿rst mea-
sure is based on linguistic tree diagrams. Using this approach, Fearon (2003) de￿nes the
distance between languages j and k to be:




where ‘ is the number of shared branches between j and k, m is the maximum number
of branches between any two languages, and ￿ is a parameter that determines how fast
18See, e.g., Alesina et al. (2003).
19See Fearon (2003) for an excellent discussion of this issue.
12the distance declines as the number of shared branches increases. Data on language
trees come from the Ethnologue project.20 A second measure is based on lexicostatistical
studies. A prime example is Dyen et al. (1992).21 They focus on 200 basic meanings,
and compute for each pair of 95 Indo-European languages the proportion of cognates.22
The distance between any two languages j and k can then be de￿ned as one minus the
proportion of cognates between j and k. In the empirical analysis the distance measure
based on tree diagrams is more useful, because it covers all languages, and not only those
from the Indo-European group.
When extracting quantitative distance measures from language trees, one relevant
question is: how much more distant should we consider two languages to be if they pertain
to completely di⁄erent families relative to if they belong to the same family? This largely
amounts to deciding the value of ￿ in the distance measure (7). Consider two language
pairs: Greek and Italian (both Indo-European, with one shared branch) and Chinese and
Italian (with zero shared branches). If, as in Fearon (2003), we take a ￿ of 1/2, the
distance between Greek and Italian is 0.74, whereas the distance between Chinese and
Italian is 1. Lowering the value of ￿ increases this relative distance. For example, if we
take a ￿ of 0.05, the distance between Greek and Italian is now 0.13, whereas between
Chinese and Italian it is still 1.
Lower values of ￿ tend to give intuitively more plausible distances. To see this,
compare three, instead of two, language pairs: Italian-Chinese, Italian-Greek and Italian-
Spanish. With the Fearon (2003) ￿ of 1/2, the relative increase in distance when going
from Italian-Spanish to Italian-Greek is larger than when going from Italian-Greek to
Italian-Chinese. With a ￿ of 0.05, this is no longer the case: the distance Italian-Greek
relative to Italian-Spanish is 1.98, whereas the distance Italian-Chinese relative to Italian-
Greek is 7.7.
20Although Fearon (2003) uses the Ethnologue to compute distances, he does not use the Ethnologue
data on the linguistic composition of di⁄erent countries. Instead, he collects data on ethnic composition
from secondary sources.
21The Dyen measure has previously been used in economics by Ginsburgh, Weber and Ortuæo (2005).
22The term cognate applies if the two varieties have an unbroken history of descent from a common
ancestral form.
13Although lower values of ￿ seem more reasonable, a priori it is not obvious which
value to take. We experiment with di⁄erent possibilities, and ￿nd that values between
0.04 to 0.10 perform well, and give similar results, in terms of the statistical signi￿cance
of the diversity measure.23 We therefore settle on a value of 0.05. Outside this range, it
remains true that indices with distances outperform those without distances, but their
predictive power is weaker.
Our view is that since ￿ has a useful economic interpretation, it makes sense to
use a value that performs well. For example, the fact that a ￿ of 0.05 has high predictive
power tells us that, in their e⁄ect on diversity, Italian and Chinese are perceived to be 6.7
times more distant from each other than Italian and Greek. This result is informative,
and very di⁄erent from the Fearon ￿ of 1/2, which would have led us to the interpretation
that Italian and Chinese are perceived to be only 0.30 times more distant than Italian
and Greek.
As for the dependent variable in our regressions, redistribution is measured by
government transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP. As in La Porta et al. (1999),
the data come from the Economic Freedom Data Network and we have taken the average
for the years 1985-1995. The distinction between transfers and subsidies is based on the
target of redistribution: if, as in social welfare programs, the bene￿ciary is an individual,
the redistribution is ￿transfer￿ ; if the target is a business, e.g., state-owned enterprise, it
is a ￿subsidy￿ . The ￿gures aggregate central and local governments.
In analyzing the e⁄ect of diversity on redistribution we introduce a number of
additional control variables, in line with La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003):
average population 1985-1995, average GDP per capita 1985-1995, legal origin, religious
composition, latitude, percentage of population above 65, regional dummies, and a ￿small
island￿dummy. Most of these control variables have been taken directly from La Porta
et al. (1999), while others come from the World Bank. A detailed description of the data
is given in the Appendix.
23In particular, in the 8 regressions we report, the diversity index with a ￿ in this range is statistically
signi￿cant at the 1% level in at least 3 of the 8 reported regressions, and at the 5% level in the remaining
regressions.
144 Linguistic distances
In this section we discuss the di⁄erent linguistic diversity indices we use in our empirical
analysis. The Ethnologue database provides detailed information on the languages spoken
in 225 countries. It also provides linguistic trees for each of the 6,912 listed languages.
We use these tree diagrams to compute linguistic distances, following the Fearon (2003)
formula in (7). Based on this information, Table 1 reports the ￿ve di⁄erent indices
discussed in Section 2: (i) GI, (ii) ELF, (iii) ER, (iv) RQ, and (v) PH. Although the data
on transfers and subsidies will limit the number of countries in our regressions to 105, we
present the di⁄erent indices for all 225 available countries.
Our main focus is on comparing ELF and GI. As argued before, ELF has been
widely used in the literature, partly because of its straightforward interpretation. GI gen-
eralizes ELF by controlling for distances between groups. Although the rank correlation
between ELF and GI is substantial, 0.69, the last column of Table 1 shows a number of
interesting patterns, when comparing both rankings.
First, Latin American countries tend to become more diverse when controlling
for distance. Their populations are typically made up of a mix of Indo-European and
Amerindian speakers. The Amerindian languages spoken in a given country are often
quite di⁄erent. For instance, Bolivia, which tops the GI ranking, moved up 54 positions,
compared to ELF. In that country, roughly 40% of the population speaks Spanish, with
the remaining 60% Amerindian languages. Within the Amerindian speakers, half speak
Quechua and one third Aymara, two languages which belong to entirely di⁄erent families.
Other examples include Mexico and Ecuador, which move up, respectively, 69 and 68
positions.
Second, African countries become less diverse when taking into account distances.
Although many languages are spoken in those countries, they tend to be quite similar.
The most extreme example is Togo, which drops 126 positions in the ranking. There are 40
languages spoken in that country, nearly all of which belong to the Niger-Congo/Atlantic-
Congo/Volta-Congo classi￿cation. The same pattern reappears in many other African
15countries: Ghana drops 119 positions, Benin 114, and C￿te d￿ Ivoire 107. The fact that
Africa becomes less diverse, compared to existing diversity measures, is relevant. Conven-
tional wisdom has often considered diversity as acting as a sort of Africa dummy. Indeed,
with the traditional ELF index, 15 out of the 20 most diverse countries are African, so
that any relation between diversity and economic performance is likely to be strongly
in￿ uenced by any characteristics speci￿c to Africa. In contrast, with GI only 3 out of the
20 most diverse countries are still African. Our main result will therefore overturn the
conventional wisdom: as we will see, taking into account distances, and thus reducing the
diversity of Africa, substantially improves the predictive power of diversity.
Third, the picture for Europe is mixed. Some countries become more diverse when
controlling for distances. This is the case of Bulgaria, a country with a sizeable Turkish
minority, or Estonia, where the majority speaks a non-Indo-European language, but the
minority is Russian speaking. Other European countries move in the opposite direction.
Andorra, where half the population speaks Catalan and the other half Spanish, drops 102
positions, on account of the small distance between both languages.
In addition to comparing ELF and GI, we are also interested in contrasting ER
and GI. Although polarization and diversity often provide similar rankings ￿ the rank
correlation between ER and GI is 0.87 ￿ there are some relevant di⁄erences. For example,
Papua New Guinea is extremely diverse (position 4), but not polarized at all (position
186). That country is made up of 829 di⁄erent groups, all of which are small. On the
contrary, some countries are more polarized than diverse. For instance, Barbados and
Guadeloupe are both essentially made of up of two groups, one speaking an Indo-European
language (English or French), and the other speaking a Creole language.
Our last index, PH, is closely related to GI: its rank correlation is 0.93. Given this
high correlation, one may conclude that peripheral heterogeneity does not add anything
new. However, it also suggests that in the absence of data to compute GI, then PH
might be a good proxy. Remember that GI requires data on distances between any two
languages spoken in any country, whereas PH only requires data on distances to the
dominant language in each country. This is relevant if one wants to use data on linguistic
16distances based on lexicostatistical studies, such as the Dyen et al. (1992) database on
Indo-European languages.24
5 Diversity and redistribution
Table 2 reports the coe¢ cients of our regressions of redistribution on GI. To make our
results comparable to previous work, we have included similar control variables as in La
Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003). Robust t-ratios are given in brackets. As
explained before, the theoretical prior is that the greater the degree of linguistic diversity,
the lower the degree of redistribution.
Column (1) reports the most basic speci￿cation, only including diversity and
a number of exogenous control variables (latitude, regional dummies, and small island
dummy). All coe¢ cients are highly signi￿cant. The coe¢ cient on diversity is signi￿cant
at the 5% level. Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003), column
(2) and (3) include legal origin and religious composition as further controls. None of
these variables are signi￿cant though. Columns (4) leaves out the regional dummies,
and adds GDP per capita. Column (5) does the same, but keeps the regional dummies.
As expected, the level of a country￿ s development increases the degree of redistribution.
In contrast to La Porta et al. (1999), the e⁄ect of diversity on redistribution is robust
to the inclusion of GDP per capita. Column (6) adds population, instead of GDP per
capita. This is in line with Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), who empirically con￿rmed
that transfers as a share of GDP are unrelated to population size, since this type of
government expenditure does not have the nature of a public good. Column (7) leaves
out regional dummies, and adds the share of population above 65. Column (8) provides
the full speci￿cation with all regressors. As can be seen, the population above 65 is highly
signi￿cant.
Based on Table 2, we can see that in all speci￿cations the e⁄ect of diversity is
robust, both in terms of magnitude and statistical signi￿cance. In half of the speci￿cations
24One advantage of lexicostatistical studies is that the distances are less coarse than those based on
language trees. When using trees, the maximum number of nodes ￿ 15 in our case ￿ determines the
number of possible distances between language pairs. Instead, the Dyen measure is more continuous.
17GI is signi￿cant at the 1% level, and in the other half it is signi￿cant at the 5% level.
The magnitude of its coe¢ cient hovers between -3.8 and -6.6. Taking column (5) as our
preferred speci￿cation, the model predicts that an increase in diversity by one standard
deviation lowers redistribution as a share of GDP by 0.97 percentage points. This e⁄ect
should be compared to an average level of redistribution of 9.5% of GDP. In other words,
an increase by one standard deviation in diversity lowers redistribution by about 10%. An
example may help to further illustrate the quantitative importance of diversity. Compare
Paraguay, with a level of redistribution of 2.3%, and Uruguay, with a level of redistribution
of 13.1%. The model predicts that the greater linguistic diversity of Paraguay should
lower redistribution by 5.6 percentage points compared to Uruguay. This implies that
about half of the di⁄erence in redistribution between the Paraguay and Uruguay can be
explained by the di⁄erence in linguistic diversity.
As for the control variables, neither the legal origin nor the religious composition
tends to have a signi￿cant impact on redistribution. There are two exceptions to this.
Socialist legal origin increases redistribution, although its e⁄ect only shows up if we
control for GDP per capita. In those regressions, the e⁄ect of having a socialist legal
origin increases redistribution by 8 to 9 percentage points. The share of Muslims tends
to lower redistribution, although its e⁄ect vanishes when we control for the share of
the population above 65. This suggests that Muslim countries tend to have a young
population. The small island dummy25 is highly signi￿cant and its coe¢ cient is robust
to all speci￿cations. Being a small island is predicted to reduce redistribution by about
6 percentage points of GDP. This variable was included, because our preliminary data
analysis suggested small islands were outliers.
Whether including linguistic distances is relevant for our understanding of redis-
tribution ought to be an empirical question. Table 3 runs the same regressions as Table
2, but uses the standard ELF index, which does not allow for di⁄erent distances between
languages. We will focus on our variable of interest ￿ linguistic diversity ￿ as the coe¢ -
25The small island dummy is de￿ned as an island with a population of less than 0.5 million. See
Appendix.
18cients on the control variables are similar to what we found in Table 1. The most obvious
result is that ELF loses statistical signi￿cance. In six out of the eight speci￿cation the
index ceases to be signi￿cant at the 10% level. Not surprisingly, all speci￿cations also
give lower R2s, although the di⁄erences are small.
Although the speci￿cations we used in Table 2 and 3 are based on the previous
work by La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003), one could have some doubts
about how general the superiority of GI over ELF is. To address this issue, we use all
possible combinations of sets of control variables to analyze the e⁄ect of diversity on
redistribution. In particular, we focus on eight sets of control variables: religion; legal
origin; regional dummies; small island dummy; latitude; GDP per capita; population;
and population above 65. The di⁄erent combinations of these eight sets of regressors give
us 255 possible regressions. Although not all of these regressions may make theoretical
sense, it is still useful to compare the relative performance of GI and ELF. It turns out
that in all 255 speci￿cations, the t-values are larger for GI than for ELF. Moreover, in
79% of the regressions, GI is signi￿cant at least at the 10% level, whereas this ￿gure
drops to 32% in the case of ELF. This leads us to conclude that including distances into
our diversity index substantially improves our results. The understanding of diversity is
therefore enhanced by incorporating linguistic distances in our index.
Another possible concern is that we have computed the ELF index using the
detailed Ethnologue database. In doing so, we did not aggregate, say, Italian and Venetian
speakers into one group. This may bias our results against the ELF index. As mentioned
before, previous studies, such as Alesina et al. (2003), have used less detailed databases, so
that de facto Venetian and Italian did not show up as distinct groups. To see whether this
is an issue, we re-ran our eight basic regressions using the linguistic fractionalization index
of Alesina et al. (2003). In six out of the eight speci￿cations, linguistic fractionalization
does not pass the 10% signi￿cance threshold. This is similar to our ￿ndings when using
the ELF index based on the Ethnologue.
196 Robustness: polarization and peripheral heterogeneity
In this section we discuss polarization and peripheral heterogeneity. Once again, the focus
is on the importance of including distances. As before, indices with distances perform
clearly better. However, amongst those indices that include distances, all of them ￿ GI,
ER, and PH ￿ perform roughly speaking equally well.
Table 4 and Table 5 report the same regressions as before, but now uses po-
larization, instead of diversity, as the explanatory variable. In Table 4 polarization is
measured by ER, which contains linguistic distances, while in Table 5 it is measured by
the RQ index, which does not account for di⁄erent linguistic distances between groups.
The results are similar to the case of GI and ELF. ER is signi￿cant at the 1% level in
three out of the eight speci￿cations, and at the 5% level in the remaining ￿ve regressions.
When not accounting for distances, only two out of the eight speci￿cations are signi￿cant
at the 5%, with the remaining six regressions not passing the 10% threshold. Taking, as
before, column (5) as our preferred speci￿cation, the model predicts that an increase in
ER by one standard deviation lowers redistribution as a share of GDP by 1.41 percentage
points. This e⁄ect is somewhat larger than the 0.97 percentage points in the case of GI.
When comparing ER and GI, it is unclear which one prevails. Both indices are
similar in their level of statistical signi￿cance: three speci￿cations at the 1% level and
the remaining ￿ve speci￿cations at the 5% level. This suggests that the concepts of
polarization and diversity have a signi￿cant overlap, and are thus hard to distinguish.
This is not surprising, given the correlation of 0.76 between the two indices in the sample
of 105 countries included in our regressions. In contrast to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005), who demonstrate the relevance of polarization in the context of ethnic con￿ ict,
we show that diversity and polarization are similar in their impact on redistribution.26
What does matter, instead, is taking into account distances between groups.
Table 6 analyzes the e⁄ect of PH on redistribution. Once again, this index,
26One should be careful when interpreting the di⁄erences between diversity and polarization. As men-
tioned before, GI is not always a pure index of diversity. Thus, the high correlation between GI and ER
might be partly due to the fact that they are conceptually more ￿similar￿than ELF and ER.
20which accounts for distances, performs well. Peripheral heterogeneity is signi￿cant at
the 1% level in four out of the eight speci￿cations, and at the 5% in the remaining four
speci￿cations. Although not reported here, if one were to leave out distances, ￿ve out of
the eight regressions would not pass the 10% signi￿cance level. The economic signi￿cance
is similar as in the case of GI: an increase in PH by one standard deviation reduces
redistribution by 1.09 percentage points. In terms of t-statistics, peripheral heterogeneity
does better than GI in six out of the eight speci￿cations. When running all 255 regressions,
the statistical signi￿cance of peripheral heterogeneity is greater in 74% of the cases.
This suggests that PH is a reasonable alternative to GI. If our main focus were to
be Europe and the Americas, there might be some advantage to using PH, rather than
GI, as it would allow us to use alternative distance measures. In all of those countries,
with the exception of Paraguay, the dominant language is Indo-European. Being the
most widely studied language family, there exist detailed lexicostatistical studies, such
as the one by Dyen et al. (1992), that o⁄er alternative measures of distances. In an
earlier version of this paper, Desmet, Ortuæo-Ort￿n and Weber (2005) used the distances
in Dyen et al. for a sample of 55 countries in Europe and the Americas, and found, once
again, that incorporating distances is crucial for diversity to be statistically signi￿cant.
In addition, a decrease in diversity by one standard deviation was predicted to lower
redistribution by around 11%, similar to the ￿gure of 10% found in the current paper for
a larger sample of countries and a di⁄erent measure of distance.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied the e⁄ect of ethnolinguistic diversity on redistribution in a cross-
section of countries. The main focus has been on the explicit introduction of linguistic
distances into the measure of diversity. Our empirical investigation shows that when we
control for distances, the e⁄ect of diversity on redistribution becomes highly signi￿cant,
both statistically and economically. At the same time, ignoring distances typically leads
to insigni￿cant e⁄ects. Although the focus of this paper has been on diversity, we have
also studied alternative measures of social tension, such as polarization and peripheral
21heterogeneity, and again, the crucial element that determines the signi￿cance of the re-
sults is whether linguistic distances are taken into account or not. The type of analysis
conducted in this paper could be applied to study the e⁄ect of ethnolinguistic diver-
sity (or polarization) on other economic variables, such as economic growth, the quality
of government, civil con￿ icts, or the degree of decentralization. This is left for future
research.
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25Country GI ELF ER RQ PH Diff GI-ELF
1 Bolivia 0.650 0.680 0.201 0.207 0.463 54
2 Belize 0.624 0.693 0.172 0.188 0.433 51
3 United Arab Emirates 0.623 0.777 0.117 0.143 0.382 34
4 Papua New Guinea 0.598 0.990 0.005 0.009 0.038 -4
5 Suriname 0.595 0.788 0.114 0.158 0.301 29
6 Chad 0.591 0.950 0.029 0.045 0.177 -1
7 Mauritius 0.564 0.641 0.184 0.195 0.499 57
8 Qatar 0.545 0.608 0.203 0.217 0.500 59
9 New Caledonia 0.542 0.834 0.100 0.116 0.462 18
10 East Timor 0.540 0.897 0.055 0.091 0.119 7
11 Niger 0.540 0.646 0.157 0.183 0.420 51
12 Malaysia 0.525 0.758 0.101 0.143 0.341 28
13 Kazakhstan 0.521 0.701 0.152 0.187 0.369 36
14 Guatemala 0.518 0.691 0.153 0.166 0.500 39
15 Singapore 0.515 0.748 0.102 0.157 0.298 30
16 Iran 0.512 0.797 0.107 0.143 0.403 16
17 Congo 0.511 0.820 0.103 0.117 0.465 11
18 Cayman Islands 0.505 0.547 0.228 0.239 0.499 65
19 Fiji 0.503 0.607 0.198 0.221 0.493 49
20 Gibraltar 0.498 0.498 0.249 0.249 0.498 72
21 Namibia 0.488 0.808 0.081 0.134 0.239 9
22 Trinidad and Tobago 0.487 0.696 0.125 0.178 0.338 28
23 Kyrgyzstan 0.481 0.670 0.144 0.193 0.349 33
24 Kenya 0.472 0.901 0.043 0.084 0.135 -10
25 Bahrain 0.467 0.663 0.108 0.175 0.314 34
26 Laos 0.466 0.678 0.102 0.149 0.336 29
27 Nigeria 0.463 0.870 0.061 0.104 0.137 -8
28 Uganda 0.461 0.928 0.029 0.064 0.119 -18
29 Guam 0.458 0.640 0.139 0.204 0.317 36
30 Estonia 0.457 0.476 0.214 0.217 0.451 71
31 Sudan 0.457 0.587 0.129 0.153 0.393 44
32 Georgia 0.453 0.576 0.130 0.165 0.366 45
33 Bhutan 0.442 0.846 0.073 0.123 0.335 -8
34 Mayotte 0.433 0.459 0.197 0.207 0.410 69
35 India 0.427 0.930 0.027 0.061 0.111 -27
36 Israel 0.407 0.665 0.094 0.158 0.296 22
37 South Africa 0.394 0.869 0.048 0.109 0.118 -17
38 French Polynesia 0.385 0.596 0.112 0.176 0.284 32
39 Central African Republic 0.385 0.960 0.017 0.038 0.183 -35
40 Dem Rep of Congo 0.376 0.948 0.021 0.046 0.077 -34
41 Cyprus 0.361 0.366 0.178 0.180 0.358 79
42 Tajikistan 0.360 0.482 0.138 0.177 0.320 57
43 Aruba 0.359 0.387 0.153 0.156 0.355 71
44 Peru 0.350 0.376 0.137 0.138 0.336 74
45 Azerbaijan 0.349 0.373 0.142 0.147 0.332 74
46 Northern Mariana Islands 0.341 0.642 0.102 0.196 0.234 17
47 Nepal 0.333 0.742 0.057 0.144 0.201 -1
48 Iraq 0.328 0.666 0.079 0.187 0.205 9
49 Afghanistan 0.325 0.732 0.064 0.160 0.186 -1
50 Paraguay 0.322 0.347 0.137 0.141 0.314 74
51 Panama 0.322 0.324 0.136 0.136 0.303 78
52 U.S. Virgin Islands 0.319 0.339 0.144 0.147 0.316 74
53 Sao Tome e Principe 0.311 0.389 0.128 0.161 0.282 59
54 Dominica 0.308 0.313 0.153 0.155 0.306 76
55 Sri Lanka 0.306 0.313 0.150 0.153 0.303 77
56 French Guiana 0.304 0.480 0.095 0.162 0.244 44
57 Mali 0.303 0.876 0.027 0.095 0.113 -39
58 Solomon Islands 0.297 0.965 0.011 0.033 0.033 -56
Table 1: Indices of diversity and polarization
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59 Bahamas 0.295 0.386 0.128 0.166 0.272 56
60 Guinea-Bissau 0.278 0.853 0.039 0.119 0.090 -38
61 Oman 0.269 0.693 0.056 0.184 0.149 -10
62 Brunei 0.265 0.456 0.085 0.152 0.221 42
63 Uzbekistan 0.263 0.428 0.093 0.150 0.228 45
64 Turkey 0.258 0.289 0.108 0.119 0.245 70
65 Thailand 0.254 0.753 0.040 0.168 0.111 -24
66 Myanmar 0.254 0.521 0.072 0.155 0.196 22
67 Nauru 0.254 0.596 0.066 0.182 0.172 2
68 Cameroon 0.248 0.942 0.009 0.049 0.062 -61
69 Sierra Leone 0.245 0.817 0.038 0.135 0.101 -40
70 Ecuador 0.243 0.264 0.109 0.115 0.238 68
71 Greenland 0.242 0.242 0.121 0.121 0.242 70
72 Vanuatu 0.238 0.972 0.008 0.027 0.016 -71
73 Turkmenistan 0.221 0.386 0.082 0.146 0.194 43
74 Macedonia 0.212 0.566 0.064 0.203 0.152 5
75 Syria 0.203 0.503 0.062 0.172 0.157 16
76 Slovakia 0.196 0.307 0.084 0.130 0.180 57
77 Saudi Arabia 0.191 0.609 0.047 0.215 0.111 -11
78 Russia 0.183 0.283 0.071 0.112 0.165 57
79 Bulgaria 0.178 0.224 0.083 0.103 0.172 65
80 Eritrea 0.178 0.749 0.030 0.164 0.088 -38
81 Mauritania 0.170 0.172 0.079 0.079 0.167 72
82 British Virgin Islands 0.167 0.167 0.084 0.084 0.167 74
83 Viet Nam 0.161 0.234 0.067 0.097 0.150 59
84 Hungary 0.153 0.158 0.071 0.071 0.153 74
85 Tanzania 0.149 0.965 0.004 0.033 0.022 -82
86 Turks and Caicos Islands 0.145 0.145 0.073 0.073 0.145 74
87 Lebanon 0.144 0.161 0.068 0.075 0.142 70
88 Liberia 0.142 0.912 0.011 0.076 0.043 -75
89 Anguilla 0.140 0.140 0.070 0.070 0.140 72
90 Indonesia 0.138 0.846 0.015 0.110 0.064 -66
91 Netherlands 0.137 0.389 0.045 0.142 0.113 22
92 Gabon 0.137 0.919 0.010 0.070 0.032 -81
93 Romania 0.134 0.168 0.063 0.079 0.130 61
94 Canada 0.129 0.549 0.038 0.193 0.097 -12
95 Argentina 0.127 0.213 0.054 0.093 0.118 51
96 Mexico 0.127 0.135 0.057 0.061 0.123 69
97 Micronesia 0.124 0.792 0.017 0.146 0.049 -64
98 Moldova 0.122 0.589 0.034 0.183 0.091 -24
99 Finland 0.121 0.140 0.059 0.067 0.120 63
100 Equatorial Guinea 0.112 0.453 0.034 0.159 0.086 5
101 Serbia and Montenegro 0.112 0.359 0.042 0.150 0.096 21
102 Belgium 0.110 0.734 0.024 0.177 0.065 -55
103 Ethiopia 0.109 0.843 0.014 0.116 0.057 -77
104 China 0.107 0.491 0.031 0.155 0.083 -8
105 Djibouti 0.099 0.592 0.030 0.228 0.064 -32
106 France 0.097 0.272 0.038 0.109 0.087 30
107 Netherlands Antilles 0.097 0.266 0.039 0.115 0.088 30
108 Armenia 0.096 0.174 0.043 0.079 0.091 43
109 New Zealand 0.095 0.102 0.045 0.048 0.094 61
110 Cambodia 0.094 0.157 0.042 0.072 0.090 49
111 Gambia 0.094 0.748 0.021 0.167 0.064 -68
112 USA 0.092 0.353 0.033 0.136 0.078 11
113 Burkina Faso 0.091 0.773 0.014 0.133 0.051 -76
114 Pakistan 0.091 0.762 0.015 0.148 0.051 -75
115 Barbados 0.091 0.091 0.046 0.046 0.091 57
116 Philippines 0.090 0.849 0.011 0.116 0.036 -93
117 American Samoa 0.088 0.116 0.041 0.055 0.086 52
118 Sweden 0.088 0.167 0.039 0.074 0.083 37
Table 1 (cont￿ d): Indices of diversity and polarization
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119 Cote dIvoire 0.085 0.917 0.006 0.069 0.029 -107
120 Nicaragua 0.081 0.081 0.040 0.040 0.081 55
121 Switzerland 0.079 0.547 0.026 0.182 0.067 -37
122 Saint Pierre and Miquelon 0.078 0.134 0.037 0.063 0.076 44
123 Guinea 0.078 0.748 0.019 0.170 0.058 -79
124 Guyana 0.077 0.078 0.037 0.037 0.076 52
125 Latvia 0.077 0.595 0.027 0.211 0.065 -54
126 Botswana 0.076 0.444 0.023 0.154 0.059 -20
127 Taiwan 0.076 0.488 0.026 0.189 0.062 -30
128 Senegal 0.076 0.772 0.013 0.156 0.039 -90
129 Benin 0.075 0.901 0.006 0.079 0.029 -114
130 Niue 0.071 0.071 0.036 0.036 0.071 48
131 Cape Verde Islands 0.070 0.070 0.035 0.035 0.070 48
132 Luxembourg 0.069 0.498 0.026 0.190 0.061 -39
133 Germany 0.067 0.189 0.029 0.082 0.063 15
134 Malawi 0.067 0.519 0.018 0.167 0.048 -45
135 Seychelles 0.066 0.067 0.033 0.033 0.066 46
136 Reunion 0.066 0.066 0.032 0.032 0.065 46
137 Ukraine 0.066 0.492 0.022 0.194 0.053 -42
138 Yemen 0.065 0.579 0.020 0.229 0.044 -62
139 Cook Islands 0.064 0.379 0.022 0.150 0.052 -22
140 Morocco 0.062 0.466 0.023 0.172 0.057 -38
141 Zimbabwe 0.060 0.526 0.016 0.165 0.043 -55
142 Togo 0.060 0.897 0.006 0.086 0.023 -126
143 Antigua and Barbuda 0.057 0.057 0.028 0.028 0.056 42
144 Mongolia 0.054 0.331 0.020 0.133 0.047 -16
145 Tokelau 0.054 0.054 0.027 0.027 0.054 42
146 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.053 0.416 0.018 0.158 0.044 -37
147 Dominican Republic 0.051 0.053 0.025 0.026 0.051 41
148 Jordan 0.051 0.484 0.016 0.175 0.040 -50
149 Madagascar 0.051 0.656 0.011 0.164 0.035 -88
150 Ghana 0.050 0.805 0.007 0.123 0.029 -119
151 Costa Rica 0.049 0.050 0.024 0.024 0.049 39
152 Egypt 0.048 0.509 0.016 0.205 0.038 -62
153 Spain 0.046 0.438 0.015 0.174 0.037 -46
154 Honduras 0.046 0.056 0.022 0.027 0.046 32
155 Algeria 0.046 0.313 0.019 0.133 0.043 -24
156 Lithuania 0.044 0.339 0.018 0.140 0.042 -31
157 United Kingdom 0.044 0.139 0.020 0.063 0.042 6
158 Martinique 0.043 0.043 0.021 0.021 0.043 34
159 Austria 0.042 0.540 0.016 0.239 0.033 -74
160 Greece 0.041 0.175 0.018 0.078 0.039 -10
161 Australia 0.039 0.126 0.018 0.058 0.038 7
162 Italy 0.039 0.593 0.011 0.167 0.031 -90
163 Angola 0.038 0.785 0.006 0.147 0.019 -128
164 Libya 0.038 0.362 0.015 0.163 0.033 -43
165 Guadeloupe 0.038 0.084 0.018 0.041 0.037 9
166 Belarus 0.037 0.397 0.014 0.156 0.033 -55
167 Zambia 0.035 0.855 0.004 0.110 0.015 -146
168 Bangladesh 0.034 0.332 0.013 0.140 0.030 -41
169 San Marino 0.032 0.494 0.016 0.247 0.032 -75
170 Kuwait 0.031 0.556 0.011 0.201 0.026 -90
171 Chile 0.030 0.034 0.015 0.017 0.030 22
172 Mozambique 0.029 0.929 0.002 0.064 0.008 -163
173 Ireland 0.028 0.223 0.013 0.103 0.027 -28
174 Albania 0.028 0.257 0.012 0.113 0.026 -34
175 Marshall Islands 0.027 0.027 0.013 0.013 0.027 23
176 Colombia 0.026 0.030 0.013 0.015 0.026 20
177 Montserrat 0.026 0.026 0.013 0.013 0.026 23
178 Somalia 0.025 0.179 0.011 0.083 0.023 -29
Table 1 (cont￿ d): Indices of diversity and polarization
28Country GI ELF ER RQ PH Diff GI-ELF
179 Venezuela 0.024 0.026 0.012 0.013 0.024 20
180 Andorra 0.024 0.574 0.009 0.227 0.020 -102
181 Grenada 0.022 0.064 0.011 0.032 0.022 2
182 Wallis and Futuna 0.022 0.407 0.008 0.198 0.017 -72
183 Comoros 0.022 0.551 0.007 0.236 0.016 -102
184 Monaco 0.022 0.521 0.008 0.200 0.019 -97
185 Slovenia 0.021 0.174 0.009 0.084 0.020 -33
186 Saint Lucia 0.020 0.020 0.010 0.010 0.020 16
187 Denmark 0.018 0.051 0.009 0.025 0.017 2
188 Kiribati 0.017 0.033 0.008 0.016 0.017 6
189 Malta 0.016 0.016 0.008 0.008 0.016 15
190 West Bank and Gaza 0.015 0.208 0.007 0.102 0.015 -43
191 Japan 0.014 0.028 0.007 0.014 0.014 6
192 Portugal 0.011 0.022 0.006 0.011 0.011 9
193 Jamaica 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.011 14
194 Brazil 0.011 0.032 0.005 0.016 0.011 1
195 Croatia 0.010 0.087 0.005 0.042 0.010 -22
196 Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.005 0.010 12
197 Liechtenstein 0.010 0.128 0.005 0.061 0.010 -30
198 St Vincent & Grenadines 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.009 12
199 Czech Republic 0.008 0.069 0.004 0.033 0.008 -19
200 Palau 0.007 0.077 0.004 0.039 0.007 -23
201 Uruguay 0.007 0.092 0.003 0.044 0.007 -30
202 Lesotho 0.007 0.260 0.003 0.121 0.006 -63
203 Puerto Rico 0.006 0.049 0.003 0.024 0.006 -12
204 Tuvalu 0.006 0.139 0.003 0.070 0.006 -40
205 Poland 0.006 0.060 0.003 0.029 0.006 -21
206 Tunisia 0.005 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.005 0
207 Swaziland 0.005 0.228 0.002 0.107 0.005 -64
208 El Salvador 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 3
209 Korea, South 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 5
210 Samoa 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 5
211 Iceland 0.001 0.019 0.001 0.010 0.001 -8
212 Burundi 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 0
213 Rwanda 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.001 0
214 Maldives 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.001 -5
215 Tonga 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.008 0.000 -10
216 Haiti 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
217 Cuba 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1
218 Bermuda 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
219 British Indian Ocean Terr. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
220 Falkland Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
221 Korea, North 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
222 Norfolk Island 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
223 Pitcairn 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
224 Saint Helena 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
225 Vatican State 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Table 1 (cont￿ d): Indices of diversity and polarization
29Dependent variable: Transfers and subsidies as % of GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GI (Greenberg) -6.313 -6.663 -3.842 -5.779 -5.071 -4.124 -4.343 -4.042
[2.60]** [2.66]*** [1.99]** [2.77]*** [2.79]*** [2.12]** [2.13]** [2.32]**
UK legal origin 2.077 3.212 3.951 3.554 2.239 4.992 4.59
[0.79] [1.45] [1.36] [1.58] [0.95] [2.30]** [2.39]**
French legal origin 2.246 3.102 3.948 3.853 2.323 4.13 4.011
[0.80] [1.25] [1.22] [1.52] [0.87] [1.57] [1.72]*
Socialist legal origin 4.949 4.973 9.4 8.441 3.989 9.126 8.666
[1.47] [1.72]* [2.54]** [2.72]*** [1.33] [2.92]*** [2.93]***
Scandinavian legal origin 1.985 5.243 6.234 6.104 4.531 6.432 6.626
[0.50] [1.17] [1.39] [1.44] [1.00] [1.70]* [1.73]*
Catholic 1980 0.029 0.01 0.02 0.024 0.031 0.034
[1.24] [0.49] [1.00] [1.05] [1.64] [1.64]
Muslim 1980 -0.093 -0.05 -0.079 -0.097 0.007 -0.024
[4.12]*** [2.51]** [3.93]*** [4.48]*** [0.31] [1.04]
Protestant 1980 -0.037 -0.045 -0.041 -0.043 -0.009 -0.02
[1.03] [1.17] [1.11] [1.12] [0.22] [0.51]
Population 1985-1995 -0.176 0.063 0.054
[0.64] [0.24] [0.20]
GDP per capita 1985-1995 1.684 1.792 0.621 1.037
[4.50]*** [3.95]*** [1.48] [2.05]**
Population above 65 0.872 0.685
[5.14]*** [4.11]***
Small island -6.246 -5.811 -5.538 -7.425 -6.672 -6.079 -6.831 -6.363
[2.29]** [2.13]** [2.55]** [3.01]*** [3.46]*** [2.55]** [3.28]*** [3.64]***
Latitude 28.638 27.7 21.188 23.328 13.402 20.909 12.059 8.049
[6.94]*** [5.64]*** [5.02]*** [6.29]*** [2.84]*** [5.04]*** [3.02]*** [1.80]*
Latin America -1.962 -1.711 -8.098 -7.077 -8.18 -4.691
[1.20] [1.05] [4.75]*** [4.50]*** [4.87]*** [3.06]***
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.635 -2.332 -5.919 -3.431 -6.15 -1.571
[1.52] [1.36] [3.63]*** [2.16]** [3.80]*** [1.07]
East Asia & Pacific -2.71 -1.755 -5.033 -5.021 -4.817 -3.446
[1.24] [0.82] [2.17]** [2.49]** [2.07]** [1.88]*
Constant 3.531 1.268 5.535 -12.842 -7.622 9.737 -11.648 -9.635
[1.64] [0.35] [1.65] [2.61]** [1.70]* [1.71]* [1.73]* [1.38]
Observations 105 105 104 103 102 102 103 102
R-squared 0.6569 0.6693 0.7905 0.7787 0.8203 0.7913 0.8225 0.8436
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2: Diversity (GI) and redistribution
30Dependent variable: Transfers and subsidies as % of GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ELF -4.763 -4.525 -2.155 0.662 -2.207 -2.057 0.588 -1.666
[2.41]** [2.34]** [1.22] [0.43] [1.44] [1.16] [0.45] [1.19]
UK legal origin 1.806 2.992 2.838 3.168 2.098 4.294 4.367
[0.67] [1.37] [1.04] [1.38] [0.88] [2.11]** [2.19]**
French legal origin 2.268 3.026 3.495 3.715 2.35 3.897 3.965
[0.77] [1.20] [1.12] [1.42] [0.86] [1.53] [1.66]
Socialist legal origin 4.195 4.49 8.404 7.626 3.674 8.596 8.22
[1.22] [1.57] [2.30]** [2.43]** [1.22] [2.78]*** [2.77]***
Scandinavian legal origin 0.94 4.92 6.266 5.716 4.297 6.568 6.412
[0.23] [1.09] [1.37] [1.32] [0.94] [1.73]* [1.66]
Catholic 1980 0.03 0.011 0.022 0.026 0.034 0.036
[1.29] [0.55] [1.08] [1.14] [1.76]* [1.73]*
Muslim 1980 -0.093 -0.058 -0.081 -0.097 0.003 -0.024
[4.12]*** [2.84]*** [3.82]*** [4.42]*** [0.15] [1.02]
Protestant 1980 -0.041 -0.056 -0.045 -0.045 -0.014 -0.022
[1.08] [1.40] [1.19] [1.12] [0.34] [0.54]
Population 1985-1995 -0.091 0.148 0.125
[0.33] [0.56] [0.46]
GDP per capita 1985-1995 1.537 1.676 0.511 0.968
[3.94]*** [3.65]*** [1.17] [1.88]*
Population above 65 0.901 0.7
[5.23]*** [4.05]***
Small island -6.632 -5.983 -5.514 -6.585 -6.467 -5.742 -5.92 -5.978
[2.49]** [2.40]** [2.47]** [2.64]*** [3.37]*** [2.33]** [2.98]*** [3.53]***
Latitude 27.524 27.788 21.516 26.24 14.6 21.358 13.593 8.746
[6.79]*** [5.61]*** [5.03]*** [7.34]*** [3.22]*** [5.01]*** [3.51]*** [2.03]**
Latin America -3.301 -2.984 -8.711 -7.796 -8.736 -5.129
[2.01]** [1.81]* [4.92]*** [4.88]*** [4.97]*** [3.36]***
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.93 -1.531 -5.457 -3.1 -5.658 -1.183
[1.10] [0.89] [3.10]*** [1.83]* [3.20]*** [0.76]
East Asia & Pacific -2.932 -1.899 -5.069 -5.074 -4.872 -3.456
[1.39] [0.94] [2.25]** [2.58]** [2.12]** [1.93]*
Constant 4.986 2.342 5.899 -12.99 -6.614 8.402 -13.473 -10.474
[2.25]** [0.61] [1.73]* [2.55]** [1.41] [1.45] [1.97]* [1.49]
Observations 105 105 104 103 102 102 103 102
R-squared 0.6581 0.6676 0.7886 0.7674 0.8147 0.7885 0.8164 0.8401
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3: Diversity (ELF) and redistribution
31Dependent variable: Transfers and subsidies as % of GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ER (Esteban-Ray) -20.685 -22.504 -16.385 -27.576 -21.352 -18.358 -22.359 -17.812
[2.47]** [2.45]** [2.40]** [4.25]*** [3.59]*** [2.58]** [3.15]*** [2.63]**
UK legal origin 1.729 3.139 4.32 3.513 2.148 5.15 4.49
[0.67] [1.42] [1.47] [1.55] [0.90] [2.36]** [2.33]**
French legal origin 2.162 3.218 4.528 4.082 2.453 4.47 4.141
[0.78] [1.30] [1.40] [1.61] [0.92] [1.71]* [1.78]*
Socialist legal origin 5.056 5.135 10.261 8.798 4.096 9.583 8.786
[1.51] [1.80]* [2.78]*** [2.82]*** [1.38] [3.12]*** [2.99]***
Scandinavian legal origin 1.677 5.009 6.478 5.849 4.228 6.521 6.336
[0.42] [1.13] [1.47] [1.41] [0.95] [1.79]* [1.70]*
Catholic 1980 0.025 0.009 0.016 0.019 0.029 0.029
[1.10] [0.47] [0.80] [0.87] [1.56] [1.45]
Muslim 1980 -0.096 -0.054 -0.083 -0.102 0.001 -0.029
[4.38]*** [2.73]*** [4.11]*** [4.91]*** [0.03] [1.28]
Protestant 1980 -0.037 -0.048 -0.041 -0.045 -0.015 -0.021
[1.10] [1.38] [1.24] [1.22] [0.40] [0.59]
Population 1985-1995 -0.256 -0.056 -0.02
[0.90] [0.22] [0.07]
GDP per capita 1985-1995 1.844 1.844 0.751 1.053
[4.88]*** [4.01]*** [1.77]* [2.10]**
Population above 65 0.841 0.677
[5.00]*** [4.06]***
Small island -6.14 -5.532 -5.48 -7.127 -6.623 -6.293 -6.981 -6.558
[2.16]** [2.01]** [2.45]** [3.07]*** [3.35]*** [2.58]** [3.48]*** [3.56]***
Latitude 30.279 29.208 21.772 23.55 13.979 21.532 12.894 8.703
[7.08]*** [5.77]*** [5.11]*** [6.56]*** [2.94]*** [5.22]*** [3.28]*** [1.93]*
Latin America -1.285 -1.017 -7.67 -6.499 -7.749 -4.294
[0.75] [0.60] [4.60]*** [4.29]*** [4.74]*** [2.88]***
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.845 -2.518 -6.24 -3.782 -6.574 -1.989
[1.55] [1.37] [3.83]*** [2.49]** [4.23]*** [1.45]
East Asia & Pacific -2.802 -1.788 -5.213 -5.273 -5.029 -3.672
[1.27] [0.80] [2.22]** [2.56]** [2.18]** [1.98]*
Constant 2.764 0.691 5.574 -14.294 -8.045 11.208 -10.505 -8.34
[1.24] [0.18] [1.62] [2.92]*** [1.74]* [1.93]* [1.61] [1.20]
Observations 105 105 104 103 102 102 103 102
R-squared 0.6545 0.6684 0.7932 0.7923 0.8244 0.7947 0.8313 0.8466
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Polarization (ER) and redistribution
32Dependent variable: Transfers and subsidies as % of GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RQ (Reynal-Querol) -17.854 -17.085 -8.419 -7.333 -10.964 -8.711 -2.535 -6.265
[2.27]** [2.09]** [1.17] [0.93] [1.60] [1.13] [0.34] [0.87]
UK legal origin 1.245 2.743 3.287 3.141 1.905 4.462 4.186
[0.45] [1.24] [1.08] [1.30] [0.78] [2.05]** [2.09]**
French legal origin 1.771 2.839 3.711 3.715 2.225 3.953 3.87
[0.60] [1.12] [1.09] [1.36] [0.80] [1.48] [1.60]
Socialist legal origin 3.695 4.201 8.443 7.573 3.332 8.516 8.004
[1.07] [1.47] [2.19]** [2.36]** [1.09] [2.70]*** [2.72]***
Scandinavian legal origin -0.291 4.383 5.477 5.048 3.71 6.167 6.026
[0.07] [0.97] [1.18] [1.18] [0.81] [1.64] [1.58]
Catholic 1980 0.028 0.01 0.02 0.024 0.032 0.034
[1.19] [0.47] [0.98] [1.04] [1.68]* [1.67]*
Muslim 1980 -0.095 -0.054 -0.082 -0.099 0.005 -0.027
[4.27]*** [2.58]** [3.83]*** [4.69]*** [0.22] [1.18]
Protestant 1980 -0.043 -0.052 -0.046 -0.048 -0.013 -0.025
[1.19] [1.35] [1.30] [1.24] [0.31] [0.63]
Population 1985-1995 -0.182 0.117 0.065
[0.61] [0.44] [0.23]
GDP per capita 1985-1995 1.579 1.761 0.51 0.991
[4.04]*** [3.63]*** [1.15] [1.86]*
Population above 65 0.897 0.69
[5.07]*** [3.90]***
Small island -6.746 -5.906 -5.493 -7.126 -6.609 -6.055 -6.298 -6.158
[2.38]** [2.34]** [2.42]** [3.05]*** [3.40]*** [2.38]** [3.17]*** [3.42]***
Latitude 30.362 30.612 22.872 26.515 15.772 22.732 13.741 9.856
[7.30]*** [6.26]*** [5.27]*** [7.69]*** [3.40]*** [5.27]*** [3.60]*** [2.20]**
Latin America -2.546 -2.274 -8.381 -7.497 -8.506 -4.939
[1.53] [1.37] [4.82]*** [4.85]*** [5.02]*** [3.30]***
Sub-Saharan Africa -3.028 -2.537 -5.975 -3.591 -6.241 -1.631
[1.72]* [1.42] [3.58]*** [2.30]** [3.86]*** [1.15]
East Asia & Pacific -3.246 -2.29 -5.326 -5.464 -5.172 -3.693
[1.55] [1.09] [2.32]** [2.83]*** [2.27]** [2.09]**
Constant 4.047 1.938 5.878 -12.636 -7.219 9.966 -12.505 -9.619
[1.82]* [0.50] [1.67]* [2.47]** [1.50] [1.63] [1.82]* [1.36]
Observations 105 105 104 103 102 102 103 102
R-squared 0.66 0.67 0.79 0.77 0.82 0.79 0.82 0.84
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Polarization (RQ) and redistribution
33Dependent variable: Transfers and subsidies as % of GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Peripheral -8.195 -8.605 -5.694 -9.958 -7.94 -6.396 -7.704 -6.417
[2.41]** [2.42]** [2.26]** [3.81]*** [3.58]*** [2.46]** [2.79]*** [2.65]***
UK legal origin 1.735 3.092 4.15 3.499 2.094 5.013 4.464
[0.67] [1.40] [1.42] [1.56] [0.89] [2.30]** [2.33]**
French legal origin 2.238 3.191 4.416 4.074 2.41 4.386 4.132
[0.81] [1.29] [1.37] [1.61] [0.91] [1.67]* [1.78]*
Socialist legal origin 4.946 5.003 10.016 8.727 3.953 9.406 8.731
[1.48] [1.75]* [2.72]*** [2.81]*** [1.33] [3.05]*** [2.97]***
Scandinavian legal origin 1.729 5.142 6.479 6.042 4.388 6.538 6.506
[0.44] [1.16] [1.47] [1.45] [0.98] [1.76]* [1.73]*
Catholic 1980 0.026 0.009 0.017 0.021 0.029 0.031
[1.15] [0.46] [0.86] [0.92] [1.56] [1.50]
Muslim 1980 -0.095 -0.051 -0.081 -0.1 0.003 -0.028
[4.29]*** [2.63]*** [4.05]*** [4.77]*** [0.14] [1.21]
Protestant 1980 -0.039 -0.048 -0.042 -0.046 -0.014 -0.023
[1.10] [1.33] [1.25] [1.23] [0.37] [0.61]
Population 1985-1995 -0.244 -0.024 -0.007
[0.87] [0.09] [0.03]
GDP 1985-1995 1.834 1.876 0.741 1.088
[4.94]*** [4.08]*** [1.76]* [2.15]**
Population above 65 0.843 0.672
[4.99]*** [4.02]***
Small island -6.231 -5.631 -5.488 -7.301 -6.683 -6.265 -7.01 -6.554
[2.23]** [2.06]** [2.49]** [3.11]*** [3.44]*** [2.60]** [3.48]*** [3.66]***
Latitude 29.656 28.713 21.622 23.144 13.577 21.359 12.53 8.435
[7.05]*** [5.77]*** [5.06]*** [6.39]*** [2.84]*** [5.15]*** [3.16]*** [1.86]*
Latin America -1.533 -1.307 -7.852 -6.684 -7.939 -4.471
[0.91] [0.78] [4.63]*** [4.39]*** [4.78]*** [3.00]***
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.852 -2.499 -6.111 -3.585 -6.412 -1.815
[1.58] [1.39] [3.75]*** [2.37]** [4.10]*** [1.32]
East Asia & Pacific -2.857 -1.819 -5.156 -5.207 -4.961 -3.626
[1.30] [0.83] [2.19]** [2.55]** [2.13]** [1.96]*
Constant 3.055 0.882 5.547 -14.068 -8.258 10.99 -10.91 -8.783
[1.40] [0.24] [1.61] [2.90]*** [1.82]* [1.91]* [1.66] [1.27]
Observations 105 105 104 103 102 102 103 102
R-squared 0.6558 0.669 0.7921 0.7885 0.8241 0.7934 0.828 0.8459
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Peripheral diversity and redistribution
34A Appendix: Description of the data
￿ Languages spoken in each country and language trees. Source: Ethnologue: Lan-
guages of the World, 15th Edition, SIL International, 2005, www.ethnologue.com.
￿ Transfers and subsidies as % of GDP: Average for 1985, 1990, and 1995. Source:
Economic Freedom Data Network.
￿ GDP 85-95: Log GDP per capita (in constant 1995 dollars), average for the years
between 1985 and 1995. Source: World Bank.
￿ Population 85-95: Log total population, average for the years between 1985 and
1995. Source: World Bank.
￿ Legal origin: identi￿es the legal origin of the company law or the commercial code
for each country. There are ￿ve possible origins: (1) English common law; (2) French
commercial code; (3) German commerical code; (4) Scandinavian commercial code;
and (5) Socialist/communist laws. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
￿ Catholic 80: the percentage of the population that is catholic in 1980. Source: La
Porta et al. (1999).
￿ Muslim 80: the percentage of the population that is muslim in 1980. Source: La
Porta et al. (1999).
￿ Protestant 80: the percentage of the population that is protestant in 1980. Source:
La Porta et al. (1999).
￿ Latitude: the absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to be between 0
and 1. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
￿ Population above 65: percentage of the population above 65. Source: World Bank.
￿ Small island dummy: islands with a population of less than 0.5 million in 1990.
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